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Abstract

In the transition experience, the Czech and Slovak Republics have made some effort to achieve
fiscal decentralization. From independence to EU accession, the devolution of power designed to
strengthen the autonomy of local governments according to the principles of subsidiarity have
also included a reform of public administration. The nature of reform efforts and their
implications for fiscal decentralization are analyzed. The failure to achieve a robust autonomy
for subnational governments is due to the ongoing adherence to the notion of ―state
administration‖ as opposed to self-government in both republics.
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“State Administration” vs. Self-Government in the Slovak and Czech Republics

Introduction
Under central planning in Czechoslovakia, local governments were largely just symbolic
and did not enjoy self-determination. All decisions impacting local governance were taken
centrally by the party; they were implemented locally by central agents commissioned to perform
―state administration‖ (státní správa). This was strict hierarchical management with complete
central government control over local decisions. Central planning in Czechoslovakia collapsed
two decades after the Prague Spring of 1968. The hopes of that spring were brought to an end by
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Prague, but in 1989 the central planning regime did finally
disappear. That enabled a renaissance of local self-government (samospráva) in Czechoslovakia.
Following the ―Velvet Revolution‖ of December, 1989, the Czechs and Slovaks
continued their uneasy partnership in the endeavour to achieve an economic and political
transformation of Czechoslovak society. In that period very early in the transition, both peoples
demonstrated unequivocal demands for local autonomy by reconstructing many independent
towns and villages. Under central planning, decisions regarding the delivery of local public
services were made exclusively by the central government. Although district and local
governments had remained in place, they could not function independently; local officials did no
more than administer, facilitate and promote the policies of the central government. The
institutions of intergovernmental finance were designed to prevent the exercise of any form of
local autonomy. Funding for police, public utilities, fire protection, and education – not to
mention subsidies provided for housing, food, and medical care – were provided by the centre
and financed by indirect enterprise taxes.
The ―velvet divorce‖ of 1993, completed by Slovak politicians without resort to the
citizenry (no plebescite or vote of any kind was held), established the two contemporary
republics. It also provided an interesting case for comparative studies. Two essentially identical
political and economic systems suddenly emerged; by watching their gradual institutional and
historical divergence over time, we can see the impact of cultural differences between the two
countries as well as the impact of the policy and strategy divergencies that gradually develop.
We will observe throughout that changes have been forthcoming since the velvet divorce, but
they always began with marginal alterations creating only gradual impact. Only after fifteen
years of such change are substantial differences becoming apparent. And it is surprising how
many things remain unchanged even after the passage of a decade and a half.
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After the 1989 revolution, local governments were again charged with the independent
delivery of public services. Since extreme centralisation had been oppressive to both the Czechs
and Slovaks, the initial decentralisation initiatives were bold ones. Many municipalities that had
earlier been forced into amalgamation were dismantled. As of 1990 it was permitted to form new
local governments, which soon numbered 2,781 in Slovakia and 6,234 in the Czech Republic.
Initially, neither country established an intermediate level of government between the centre and
the municipalities, but both did so later, as we shall see.
Because so many of these municipalities are very small and lacking in human and other
resources, the Czech and Slovak central governments have felt that authority cannot be devolved,
that prerogatives and resources cannot be vouchsafed to local government personnel. The towns
and villages have no capacity to generate sufficient revenues for their needs; ―own revenues‖
include those derived from a property tax, a small and rather trivial assortment of local fees and
taxes, and from the sales of state-owned properties that were transferred to local governments
after 1989. These represent only a very small fraction of local budget receipts; most of the local
government revenues come through grants or shared taxes from the central government.
If all such transfers were unconditional, one could speak appropriately of municipal
autonomy. In actual fact, their financial situation leaves municipalities little independence, since
when the transfers are made, there are usually strings attached.
Moreover, the municipalities have many mandated tasks to perform and funds transferred are
hardly enough to cover the bases. Without independent financial resources, there is in fact little
financial independence in the twin republics.
The financial situation is hardly the sole determinant of municipal dependence. The very
structures of governance from the beginning of the transition era have reflected the institutions of
the previous regime with the continuation to the present of the tradition of ―state administration.‖
This social arrangement says to the municipalities precisely how they will be responsible for
―governing themselves.‖ A more or less arbitrarily limited set of activities are declared to be the
substance of local governance. The remainder of the many activities that the independent
municipal governments of many countries undertake to perform are declared by constitutional
law to be activities and public services for which the central government alone is responsible.
True, the central government may choose to delegate some of those tasks to the municipality and
might even provide compensation for the performance. But all decision-making prerogatives for
that function remain vested in the central government.
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Mayors, therefore, are not responsible for all municipal functions. They are responsible
only for those functions that the constitution and the central government tell them they must
perform. All of those other functions performed by mayors in many democratic countries belong
to agents of the central government housed in an office down the street from the Czech or Slovak
mayor and managed by someone who receives their instructions and directives from Prague or
Bratislava.
Before these two former partners became members of the European Union in 2004, they
were persuaded that they needed to implement ―reforms of public administration.‖ That could
have drastically changed the complexion of state administration and it did affect
intergovernmental relations, since it introduced a new level of government, the region (kraj). But
the old system was durable enough so that state administration continued.
This paper addresses questions as to why and how the institution of state administration
was constructed and why it has been so durable in countries that have for a decade and a half
given lip service to self-government (samosprávy). The paper is also concerned with the
question of the impact that such institutional arrangements have on the functioning of
subnational governments. The reasons why state administration lived on after the disappearance
of communism will also be considered and the reader will observe that state administration
seems to be the natural offspring of that system. One section of the paper will review the
constitutional basis of the system of state administration. The changes in intergovernmental
relations introduced from the beginning of the transitional era will be reviewed and traced on
through to the present. It will be demonstrated that there was a consant, if not terribly effective,
pursuit of fiscal decentralization in that process. Somewhat more effective were the introduction
of institutional reforms designed to rationalize and modernize public administration, as shall be
shown. Finally, we shall look to the future and draw some conclusions about intergovernmental
fiscal relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

The Many Small Municipalities of the Twin Republics

For the first ten years of the transition, the governmental and administrative systems of
both the Czech and Slovak Republics, including the fiscal organization, were composed of only
two tiers, the central and municipal governments. The number of independent municipalities in
both republics has increased significantly since 1989. Many towns and villages that had been
forced into larger, more convenient administrative units during the communist period were
4

permitted to reclaim their independence after 1989 and they did so with an enthusiasm reflective
of a strong demand for local autonomy. Table 1 shows the breakdown of municipality size in the
Czech Republic by 1994, which is long enough
Table 1 about here
after the Velvet Revolution to show the effects of the reorganization of cities and towns
desired by the populace upon regaining independence. One cannot help but notice here that 3,760
Czech municipalities (60.3% of the total) consist of less than 5,000 inhabitants. Only 66
municipalities (1.1% of the total of 6,230) are cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants.
Slovakia has similar numbers of municipalities for a population roughly half as large as
that of the Czech Republic. Table 2 indicates the number of municipalities in the Slovak
Republic per city size for each decade from 1950 to 2000. In that latter decade, 41.5% of
Slovakia’s municipalities had 499 or fewer inhabitants. Of the country’s 2,883 municipalities,
only 2.5% had 10,000 or more inhabitants. One must keep in mind that the number of
municipalities per million inhabitants is substantially larger in these two republics than anywhere
else in the region. Hungary has about half as many municipalities for their population size, but
Hungary too has a substantially greater number of cities and towns than other countries in the
region.
Table 2 about here
A rather fierce demand for local independence has historical roots in both these republics
as documented by Lacina and Vajdova (2000). In the mid-nineteenth century the Czechs were
striving to achieve a more modern concept of local governance. At an 1848 congress in Kroméříž
an anti-feudal, democratic strata of the population advocated municipal self-determination. This
included demands for the free election of representatives, the right to organize municipal police
and to inform the citizenry of municipal economic activities. As subjects at that time of the
Habsburg Empire, there was no chance that all of these demands would receive a positive
response. The Constitution of the Empire, however, did proclaim some important rights for
municipalities. The independent municipality was recognized as the basic unit of a free state,
even though democratic approaches were not to be implemented in the 1850s.
From 1918 to 1938 the newly independent Czechoslovak Republic seized the opportunity
to strengthen local governance as a part of establishing democratic principles of public
administration. Three tiers of local government – municipalities, districts and regions – were
introduced with representatives chosen by free election. The constitution and laws of the republic
secured their independence from state administration.
5

The Nazi occupation of the Republic and their creation of the "Free Slovak State" in 1939
interrupted the normal democratic development of local governance until 1945. After l948 and
the arrival of communism, the local government system in the Czechoslovak Republic was
replaced by the highly centralized economic planning system of Marxism-Leninism. Municipal
rights and prerogatives were severely restricted, especially regarding financial issues. As has
been observed above, a new democratic system of local government began to be rebuilt after the
Velvet Revolution and the number of municipalities, already large, began again to increase.

Managing Small Municipalities in the Czech Republic
The problem with the large number of small municipalities is that it is very difficult to provide
competent administration for them. Resource and personnel limitations were the common
stumbling blocks in the effort to transform the municipalities into functioning, independent units
of administration.
The World Bank (2003) insists that excessively small communities cannot fully benefit
from a regime of fiscal autonomy, since their tax bases are not sufficiently large; they lack
technical and administrative capacity beause they are unable to retain qualified staff; they cannot
exploit economies of scale in the delivery of public services, since there is no possibility of
privatizing or outsourcing the underdeveloped local services available. It should occur to us that
one possible answer to excessive municipal fragmentation might lie in the notion of
specialization and division of labor growing out of alliances of small communities. Regrettably,
as the World Bank correctly observed, municipal cooperation in service delivery has to this point
remained very limited.
The Czech and Slovak Republics have unswervingly retained the logic of the essential
dependence of municipal governance. It is simply assumed that the Czech and Slovak peoples
desire fiercely to have municipal independence rather than to exercise genuine local autonomy.
The central government seems to infer that as long as the citizenry may live in a town or village
with its own name and identity, it will not be upset if the central government must basically take
over a large share of the management issues. The lack of resources and capacity, according to the
conventional wisdom, implies the necessity of state administration for the towns and villages of
the Republic. It is important to note, however, that the center has also not hesitatted to intervene
in larger municipalities that are lacking in neither manpower nor resources.
But the World Bank paper cited above indicates some of the options that may mitigate
municipal fragmentation. The first is considered the most expedient, but it is what both republics
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abhor — forced amalgamations of local governments. Experiences in the 1960s and 1970s with
such were generally viewed as unrepresentative and arbitrary. The second option is voluntary
amalgamation, which might avoid social tensions and reflect local preferences. But this could
prove to be a costly approach requiring costly financial incentives to encourage towns and
villages to join associations or special districts to deliver public services with greater scale
economies.
A third option would be an asymmetric assignment of resources and responsibilities to
local governments. Most of the responsibilities currently assigned to small communities would
be transferred to ―designated‖ or ―statutory‖ towns on the one hand, or to the new self-governing
regions on the other.
In the Czech Republic, this challenge seems to have evoked a dual response. On the one
hand, we have seen the administrative reorganization of state administration by reassigning tasks
from the old districts to ―towns with expanded functions‖ on the one hand and to the newly
created regions on the other. Over the past few years Czech authorities have undertaken an
administrative reorganization and reform involving the establishment of eleven new regional
administrative units, the Kraje. The new regions have assumed some of the administrative
functions of the centre and some of those of the municipalities, but the latter are not vertically
subordinated to the regions and they still report directly to the centre. The regions have not
received a mandate to assist small municipalities lacking the resources to manage their
administrative functions independently. But there has been a tendency for the smaller
municipalities to begin to look for alliances with neighbouring towns or villages to specialize and
divide the labour of social, educational and other public service functions.

Managing the Small Municipalities of the Republic of Slovakia
Nemec, Berčík and Kukliš (2000) observe that the many small municipalities of the
Slovak Republic represent a very nonintegrated structure resulting from historical developments
after 1989. At that time, the political situation did not permit measures that would have provided
the incentives to induce mergers of many small municipalities to produce a more integrated
structure. The total number of municipalities actually increased through the 1990s due to the
division of municipalities.
Nižňanský (2006), the Slovak Republic’s spokesman for fiscal decentralization,
discussed his now-replaced government’s intent to continue to pursue power devolution, but in
describing the role of self-governing bodies in public administration failed to indicate any
7

substantial movement away from state administration. The regulation of public responsibilities
by ―self-governing bodies‖ occurs only within the framework of their territory and competence
and local sovereignty is only conceivable ―in compliance with the constitution and the law.‖
Because the state is the legislator, it seems logical to Nižňanský that the state will endeavor
through the law to provide limitations on self-government. It is necessary, therefore, to ensure
the status of self-governing bodies through the institutional, financial and constitutional
provisions.
Institutions must assure choice through elections and the regulation of all relevant issues
within the legal framework. Financial provisions must ensure municipal and regional
participation in revenues from state taxes. This is in contrast to the thought that local
governments would benefit most from being able to generate their own revenues to assure more
independent action. Finally, because of European Union influence, the Slovaks are now planning
more actively to address and adjust horizontal and vertical income imbalances across
municipalities and regions.
If Slovakia’s many small municipalities are self-governing, Nižňanský emphasised, it is
because of the establishment of regional self-governing bodies in Slovakia. He is convinced, however,
that the establishment of the new regions to assist in the provision of municipal services is not all that
is necessary for local self-government. If a small local government is not able to provide public
services on its own, they could be provided by a diversity of ―voluntary partnerships, common
councils, companies, and agencies operating on the basis of contractual agreements.‖ Sometimes it
will be possible for larger municipalities to provide contractual services to smaller municipalities in
their proximity.

The Durability of State Administration
Czech Republic. Before accession to the European Union, beginning at about the turn of the
millenium, the Czech and Slovak Republics responded positively to the need for a reform of
public administration. The most apparent change required for the Czech Republic was the
establishment of ―regional territorial units.‖ The Slovaks were willing to push beyond that need
and do some other things (Bryson and Cornia, 2006) in need of no further discussion at this
point. With those reforms basically completed to the satisfaction of the EU (accession was
granted and then achieved in May, 2004), there is no substantial pressure to carry those reforms
further at the present time. State administration as a governing principle was not overthrown at
that point, so the EU seems to have accepted the traditional wisdom that the smallness of
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municipality size requires both regional governments to help perform state administration and
the central government’s continued role in what local sovereignty would do for itself.
Just prior to the accession, in March of 2004 the Czech government issued resolution
No.237, ―the progress and main directions of the reform and modernization of central state
administration comprising the solution of the management and organisational support‖
(Vidláková, 2006). The vision for the reform was the achievement of ―a flexible and better
functioning of central state administration‖ rather than an enhancement of local governance
capacity. An important emphasis was on
good governance with professional and impartial civil servants. This was largely, in Vidláková’s
view, to target a reduction in corruption in the Czech Republic before EU accession.
The five ―main directions‖ of the reform cited by Vidláková were:
1) rationalization of central state administration processes; 2) improvement of central state
administration management; 3) quality improvement of central state administration;
4) implementation and improvement of civil service in central administrative authorities; and 5)
rationalization of central state administration financing.
A discussion about the implications of fiscal decentralization and the limitations of state
administration continues in some quarters, but without prospect of further steps toward the
establishment of local sovereignty and the elimination of central government’s ongoing
management of whatever share of municipal affairs have been written into the constitution and
laws.

In the Slovak Republic.
The objectives and design of the Slovak reform of public administration was introduced
by an official paper of the Government Office (2000). Interestingly, that document listed areas of
governance that would remain under local state administration after the reform. It was announced
that the central government was to continue to provide for local police, criminal investigation,
military administration, the state veterinary office, the state hygienist office, the environmental
office, the cadastral office, the land and forest office, the social office and the tax office. This is a
most imposing list of subnational activities for which Slovak municipalities and regions continue
to have neither responsibility nor managerial prerogatives. So state administration retained its
lock on the Slovak policy mentality, even in a reform that did begin to make some important
additions to the activities reflecting local autonomy.
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But the level and the organization of state administration were affected by the reform of
public administration. An indication of the resources committed by the central government to
state administration is given by the relevant figures on employment. Before the reform, state
administration employed 287,817 or 84.7% of total
government employment. Only 52,100 were employed in self-government at the local
level, which was only 15.3% of total government employment after the reform was implemented.
The number employed in local self-government increased from c. 15% to 63%.
The Slovak reforms were further reaching. Local governments received the right from the
beginning of 2005 to set their own ―tax rates‖ (a term applied not only to the real estate tax but
also to the limited number of user fees and local taxes already extant). They were also allowed to
introduce new ―taxes.‖ The municipalities received full discretion to adjust those old system
rates and apply exemptions according to their own preferences.
These are certainly genuine measures of fiscal decentralisation, but it may be even more
significant that municipalities were granted policy control over the property tax. The applicable
legislation pertaining to real estate taxation (Parliament, 2004) came into
effect in January 2005. It transferred responsibility for the establishment of binding
regulations on taxation rates for buildings, land, apartments and non-residential
premises to local self-government bodies. Those rates are to be set according to the specific local
conditions prevailing in the municipality. Of particular interest is the fact that the use of centrally
established coefficients on the use and area of the land and structures taxed has been eliminated.
A perspective of the current relationships of self-government to state administration is
provided in Figure 1. One observes here that the system of state administration, although
reorganized and somewhat more limited in scope, is alive and well in the Slovak Republic.
The reform of public administration eliminated the District Offices for state administration,
transferring those activities from the district offices to designated cities and regional
governments. State administration in the Slovak Republic was thereby „modernized and
reformed,― but clearly this was done with the intent to render state administration sufficiently
serviceable to be retained indefinitely.
Figure 1 about here
Power, Governance and Intergovernmental Relationships
The Czech Republic
The democratic constitution of Czechoslovakia and the critical legislation addressing the
subject of power in today’s Republic, were drafted by members of the central government. These
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foundation documents came into being in the light of liberated hopes but in the shadow of the
previous, highly centralized regime. In Chapter one of the Czech Constitution (1992), under
„Fundamental Provisions,― Article 2 declares that „the people are the source of all power in the
State; they exercise it through bodies of legislative, executive and judiciary power.― According
to paragraph 3 of Article 2, ―state power shall serve all citizens and may be applied only in
cases, within limits and by methods defined by law.‖
In Article 8, ―self-government of territorial self-governing units‖ is guaranteed.
Article 99 declares that the Czech Republic ―shall be divided into communities, which shall be
fundamental self-governing territorial divisions, and regions, which shall be superior selfgoverning territorial divisions.‖ Article 100 guarantees ―citizens inhabiting a particular area,…
have the right of self-government.‖ Article 101 promises that a ―community shall be
independently administered by a community assembly,‖ that a ―superior self-governing
territorial division shall be independently administered by an assembly of representatives,‖ that
self-governing, subnational units ―are public-law corporations which may have their own
property and which operate according to their own budget,‖ and that ―the State may intervene in
the activities of self-governing territorial divisions only if such intervention is required by
protection of the law and only in a manner defined by law.‖
Observation of what subnational governments may do does not necessarily reveal the
very important substance of what they may not do. The ―independent administration‖ spoken of
in these passages pertains only to those particular functions allowed by the constitution and laws.
Article 104 gives some indication of the powers ―delegated to‖ lower territorial ―selfgoverning‖ bodies. Paragraph (2) indicates that ―a community assembly shall decide on matters
of community self-government save in cases where these matters are entrusted to the assembly of
a superior self-governing territorial division.‖ The constitution neatly avoids the transfer of many
local functions normally regarded as a part of local governance to the municipalities and regions.
But local assemblies, according to paragraph (3) may issue binding ordinances only ―within the
scope of their jurisdiction.‖
Article 105 limits the exercise of state administration ―to territorial self-government bodies only
when so provided by law.‖ Local government may perform local functions only when the
constitutional law and other legislation permit. In fact, the power that resides in the people
resides in them only through their central government, not their local representatives.
Before admission to the European Union, the Czech and Slovak Republics were
encouraged to modify the high degree of centralization built into their traditions through reforms
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of public administration. The EU’s Phare program (1998), designed to assist pre-accession
countries to prepare for membership, reminded the Czechs that in addition to traditional services
provided by public administration (municipal, health care, school, transport services etc.), some
"classical" administration activities are also included in advanced countries. These include such
things as issuing licences, documents, permits, certificates, providing information, and so on.
Phare intoned that a number of such activities are no longer viewed as the exclusive domain of
the State. ―Our new experience shows that many operational tasks, professional decision-making,
execution of supervision, testing etc. can be decentralized and transferred to self-government or
to private entities.‖
After the reform had been implemented, Ježek, Marková, and Váňa (2004) would write
that the state delegates its power and public administration functions differently to different
municipalities. All of the 6,258 municipalities (extant in 2004) execute self-government with the
same basic scope of operations the state delegates to them. To more than 380 municipalities the
state extends additional delegated authority. The greatest scope of delegated authority is to 205
of these 380, which perform state administration for the central government while also governing
themselves within the sphere granted by the constitution and legislation.
In fairness, it should be noted that critical comments regarding the local autonomy
enjoyed by muncipal governments in the Czech and Slovak Republic should be understood from
a comparative perspective. When one compares these two governments to those of other
transition countries, especially a number of those once a part of the Soviet Union, they must be
praised for the admirable degree of independence they have provided for local governments. But
because these countries have entered with enthusiasm into formal associations with the most
advanced countries, their achievements are compared here with the best of governmental
practice. That comparison is obviously going to be less favorable for the Czechs and Slovaks.
Kameničková (2003) admaits that local self-government is still relatively weak in the
Czech Republic for reasons other than the degree to which authority is delegated or retained by
the central government. Local autonomy and authority are a financial issue as well.
Kameničková emphasizes the lack of local taxes in the Czech Republic and that constitutional
authority adopted a tax-sharing principle rather than empowering subnational governments to
generate any substantial portion of their own funds. As a result, local governments have no
possibility of influencing their own tax revenues, the most important source of local receipts. She
indicates that local governments do have some limited influence on the yield of real estate tax
and local fees, the parameters of which are designed by the state. But they can merely choose
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within those bounds the state indicates. The significance of these revenues in the total budget is,
Kameničková concedes, ―somewhat negligible.‖
It is claimed that Czech municipalities enjoy substantial spending autonomy, but little
revenue-generating autonomy. Realistically, however, if municipalities are unable to raise their
own revenues and funds transferred from the center are not sufficient to meet an assortment of
pressing needs, including infrastructure needs, the municipality is in a difficult position. Nor is
the difficulty greatly ameliorated when transfers have few strings attached. The municipality is
forced to fund what is most desperately needed and the opportunity cost of the decision to spend
on that item will foreclose other highly desirable alternatives. If infrastructure needs have been
growing for forty years, there will be compelling need to spend on the most pressing
infrastructure issues. To make the claim that infrastructure spending is an indication of local
autonomy is to assume that infrastructure spending is chosen freely among possible alternative
projects.1
As the backlog of needs declines, of course, and as transfers become more generous, the
choices are less difficult. The less the scarcity, the greater the autonomy. The perception of
autonomy on the part of municipal officials in the Czech Republic is not such as to support the
claim that the abundance of transfers has ever eliminated the need for hard choices by the
subnational governments.2
Oliviera and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) indicate that in the 2000 reforms of
intergovernmental fiscal relations, the distribution of shared taxes was essentially shifted from a
derivation principle to a per-capita distribution. Doing this has not yet met the remaining
challenges of ―overcoming municipal fragmentation, strengthening municipal borrowing, and
promoting transparency, autonomy, and accountability,… transferring fiscal powers to the selfgoverning subnational units, equalizing fiscal opportunities, and restoring incentives for local
taxes.‖ These experts assess the situation optimistically, noting that reform is a process rather
than an event and that it will take time to reach the point the Czech government wishes to reach.
1

The example of a small municipality that was told it must repair the roof of its elementary school or have the
school closed is an apt one. (I owe this illustration to Lucie Sedmihradska, related in May, 2007.) This kind of
expenditure would not be an optional one. Ignoring the sacrifice and lost opportunities associated with the
painstakingly collected revenues enabling such expenditures certainly does not clarify the requirements of local
fiscal autonomy.
2
A survey of Czech local officials, taken with the assistance of SMO in Prague and ZMOS in Bratislava by the
current author and Gary C. Cornia, and analyzed in a forthcoming paper, demonstrates clearly that strings are
attached to a good number of transfers and that local officials do not feel that intergovernmental fiscal relations
provide the sense of considerable local fiscal independence.
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A problem that must be overcome is that ―reforms made line ministries responsible for
defining the functions to be transferred to the new regions, but it is unclear whether the central
authorities are prepared to relinquish fiscal decisionmaking powers to lower-level authorities. In
addition, it is unclear whether the central government and Parliament are committed to
transferring significant revenue and spending autonomy to regional and local authorities.‖ With
regard to the provision of opportunities for the local governments to function with greater
independence in fiscal matters, Oliviera and Martinez-Vazques (2003) assert that ―there appears
to be wide consensus on the need for and possibility of restoring incentives to mobilize local
revenues— without undermining the central government budget. One way is through property
taxes, by better defining and expanding their base and by providing regional and local authorities
with limited discretion to establish property tax rates. A second possibility is to introduce a
regional or local individual income tax, with a proportional rate that piggybacks on the national
(progressive) individual income tax.‖ This conclusion follows clearly from the nature of the
problem analyzed. Genuine fiscal autonomy cannot be achieved by municipalities fully
dependent on the central government for their funds. In the view of the present author, there is
also no guarantee of ―partial autonomy‖ for the Czech case based on dependence regarding
revenues and independence regarding budget expenditures.

The Slovak Republic
The situation in Slovakia before the reform was aptly described by the government’s
specialist on fiscal decentralization, Viktor Nižňanský (2000). It was that the central government
directly and indirectly (through the district and regional offices of state administration) provided
roughly 90 percent of all public services. Funding decisions about them were made at the central
level; district and regional offices had no notable decisionmaking power or even influence on the
amounts or destinations of centrally-provided funding. Moreover, regional self-governing bodies
were not yet operational, and local self-governing bodies remained tightly constrained in their
policy and budget decisions on major public services such as education, social care, health care,
services, culture, and transportation.
Slovak authorities on local government Nemec, Nemec, Berčík and Kukliš (2000) point
to Law No. 221/1996 on the territorial and administrative organization of the Republic as
establishing the legal framework for the exercise of local self-government. The municipality is
alleged to be the basis of independent and representative local self-government. The law also
calls for the creation of counties, of eight regions and of seventy-nine districts, all authorized for
14

state administration. Municipalities and military counties may also do so as prescribed by law.
The authority and capacity of the regional and district offices were expanded significantly
over time. State administrative tasks were carried out in thirty-two areas of activity by the end of
1998. They managed budgetary and semi-budgetary matters in about 7,500 organizations and
facilities in education, 370 in social care, 95 in health care and 39 in cultural affairs. These
offices employed in excess of 135,000 employees, and the administration and manpower
requirements of regional and district offices employed another 20,000.
The state administrative functions exercised by regional and district offices include: state
defense; general internal administration; trade licenses and consumer protection; civil protection;
environmental management; fire protection; finances, prices and management of state property;
regional development; agriculture, forestry and hunting; state veterinary care; public
transportation and road management; public and concession procurement; health care; education;
social affairs; culture; regulation; and international operation (Csanda, 2000, p. 307).
On the basis of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, Csanda sets forth some
of the main problems and negative experiences in local self-government in the Slovak Republic
from the perspective of the municipalities. He indicates first of all problems of subsidiarity, the
concern that the state performs many functions that could better be performed for local citizens
by local government. He further lists the right to the administration of matters concerning the
municipality’s territory, as well as those concerning all the inhabitants of Slovak cities and
townships. He is concerned about the independent administration of matters and issues addressed
by Article 67 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. That document states that ―in matters
concerning territorial self-government, the municipality makes its independent decisions;
responsibilities and constraints may be imposed on it only through an act of law.‖ Csanda
explicates the basic problem as follows (p. 387):
the creators of the legislation on municipalities did not take into account historical
domestic and foreign experience and custom in defining the competencies of municipal
bodies. Self-governing bodies in the Slovak Republic thus far have not been vested with
the rights and abilities to manage a substantial portion of the public administration in
their territories—as if our legislature looks upon the self-governing bodies that are
closely connected to the local community and its everyday problems with a certain
mistrust.
As was mentioned in the Czech case, an important part of local government autonomy is
fiscal autonomy. From the perspective of Nižňanský (2000), financial adjustment ought to
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provide municipalities and cities with the necessary resources to enable them to perform their
functions, but state assistance is usually fraught with a serious problem. It must not interfere with
the diversity of financial powers that accrue to autonomous municipalities. ―If a financial
adjustment, for example, were to cover differences 100 percent, territorial self-governments
would lose interest in using their own taxation authority and would instead rely totally on
adjustment mechanisms (pp. 6,7).‖
Elections in 2006 revealed that the Slovak citizenry had much less respect for Slovakia’s
decentralizing government than outside agencies and observers had. They voted it out, selecting
a new coalition that left the continuity of policy somewhat open to question. The central
government, for which Nižňanský was the plenipotentiary on matters of fiscal decentralization,
considered state power from a very unusual perspective for this part of the world. Its view was
that the role of the state in public administration should be defined in terms of what it should not
undertake to perform.
The state’s recommendation for reform of public administration in Slovakia has been to
pursue fiscal decentralization while anticipating a marked decrease in the role for
state institutions in public affairs and a transfer of most public service responsibilities to
regional self-governing bodies. It was not as confident about transfering such responsibilities to
the municipal level. The state's role in public administration should not go beyond supporting,
controlling, and organizing tasks with respect to external independence (foreign policy, national
defense and civil protection); maintaining law and order (e.g., selected areas of security,
education, trade, water supply, medical and hygienic supervision); protecting freedom and civil
rights; social legislation; and national economic policy. These tasks should be performed by the
central government and regional offices. All remaining tasks should be the responsibility of local
and regional self-governing bodies. This ideal, especially given the altered political situation in
the country, appears somewhat utopian at this point.

The Impact of Reform and Development on State Administration
As time passes, attitudes of voters and policymakers gradually change toward even basic
institutions of governance. Moreover, as dissatisfaction becomes focussed and reforms are
undertaken, even basic institutions can change, although the process is seldom a rapid one. As
we have seen in previous sections, the dynamics of governance, the exigencies of preparation for
accession to the European Union, the experience with governance, and other factors have had an
impact on basic institutions in both the Czech and Slovak Republics. This section is designed to
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pull together the essence of how reforms and the passage of time have come to change the basic
institutional arrangements of state administration. Much of what needs to be said in that regard
has already been discussed above, so the need here is simply to summarize and elaborate on a
few points.
Outsiders have tended to call to the attention of the Czechs and Slovaks that, although the
new fiscal system established after the Velvet Revolution was designed to be more like western
systems in general, the heritage institutions of central planning still affected its final complexion
rather strongly. The anticipated solution to residual centralization was the adoption of reforms of
public administration. These reforms added a regional level of governance in both countries and
went further than that in Slovakia. The Czechs, more concerned with the management of national
deficits and debt, did not pause to reconsider the fine points of intergovernmental finance that the
Slovaks found important. As we saw, the Slovak Republic empowered municipalities to set their
own, local tax rates and user fees and to introduce new taxes and fees. Incidentally, it appears
that actions proposed in the Czech Republic in April of 1007 could lead to some innovations
similar to those of Slovakia, including a 15% flat tax for the income tax. But at the time of
writing, that development is still in the process of political review.
In Slovakia, Municipalities were also granted greater discretion over their use of the
property tax. New regulations transferred responsibility for the establishment of tax rates for
buildings, land, apartments and non-residential premises to local self-government bodies. These
changes were often overlooked by the media, which were intrigued with slovakia’s adoption of
the 19% single tax rate for the VAT as well as for the corporate and personal income tax.
But in both cases, the attempt has been to rationalize and modernize state administration
rather than to move toward its elimination. Reforms have attempted to establish more clear lines
of authority and improve hierarchical relationships at the various levels of state administration
(Lacina and Vajdova, 2000). Reforms have attempted to improve the relationships between the
state-appointed, centrally managed organizations delivering state administration services on the
one hand and on the other hand the elected local officers performing ―self-government‖ tasks,
some of which need to be coordinated and correlated with centrally managed activities. Whether
this is seen as organizational tinkering or rationalizing human resources institutions, it is not to
be understood as pursuing a path of eliminating central management of local affairs.
Langšádlová (2003) has provided information and data (found in Table 3) that give the reader a
good sense of the cost effects of shifting tasks of state administration from district offices to
selected municipalities.
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At the beginning of 2003, 205 municipalities assumed the performance of delegated
functions of state administration when the district offices were eliminated. They were
empowered by new laws of public administration reform to do so; other tasks formerly assigned
to district offices were transferred to the new regional governments. Municipalities with
delegated functions received transfers in the amount of 4.337 billion CZK to perform 12,984
functions.
It is fascinating to see the European Union modernize its policies, especially in the form
of the relatively new Lisbon Program. Some expect the Lisbon approach to economic
development, which moves away from the traditional programs of regional subsidies to a less
costly promotion of information technologies and telecommunications as the high-tech vehicle to
progress within the community as a whole. The Czech Ministry of Finance (2005) has expressed
that country’s determination to pursue that path toward development. The Lisbon program is
seen by the Czech government as „a means of changing the European economy with the effort to
catch up with the most developed world economies. More likely it is an attempt to fulfil the
European vision of future, based on modernisation of EU economy while maintaining the
particularities of its social model.―
Table 3 about here
Yet this same modern European Union seems to have accepted as ―reform‖ a mere paring
down of state administration and a shifting in the organization charts of where this central work
is performed. The Czech and Slovak central governments’ fairly complete management of local
governance remained even after the reform of public
administration. The standard defense of state administration in the Czech Republic has been that
it is the unavoidable solution to the problem of the many small municipalities. The Slovak
Republic is less complacent about the problem of local governance and is seeking other
solutions, as we have seen. When the Slovaks discuss the fundamentals of the question, the most
obvious solutions are all listed. Some, not being perceived as being politically realistic or
credible are not discussed at length. We return to this issue in the conclusions below, but note
here that the EU appears satisfied with this rationalization of these centralist institutional
arrangements.

Conclusions
As a part of its reform of public administration, the Czech parliament passed an
Act on the Establishment of Municipalities on April 12, 2000. Paragraph 19, section 1 of that act
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provided for the merger of two adjacent municipalities, which action must first be ―discussed‖
with the District Authority. Section 3 allowed a municipality to join a neighbouring one.
Paragraphs 46 and 50 described possibilities for legal cooperation between Czech
municipalities. Such cooperation may proceed on the basis of a contract to perform a particular
task, or a voluntary association of municipalities may be formed for such purposes, or, finally, a
legal entity may be formed by two or more municipalities to pursue joint interests. Paragraph 50
spells out the kinds of activities an association of municipalities may pursue, e.g., education,
social care, health, culture, fire protection, public order, environmental protection, tourism and
care for animals. Cooperation is legal and by implication desirable where the many small
municipalities of limited resources wish to ensure ―the cleanliness of the municipality,
management of vegetation and lighting in public places, collection, removal and safe treatment,
use or disposal of domestic refuse, water supply and sewage disposal and treatment, installation,
expansion and improvement of main networks and public passenger transport systems to provide
transport services.‖ A number of other such activities are listed in the sections of this paragraph.
In the Czech Republic, this challenge seems to recommend the administrative union of
small groups of villages. But the work of establishing municipal alliances is just beginning, and
it is apparent that this is the method by which greater local autonomy could be achieved. There
has been a tendency for the smaller municipalities to begin to look for alliances with
neighbouring towns or villages to specialize and divide the labour of social, educational and
other public service functions. It should be emphasized that the alliance of small units provides
for a larger base of resources with which to pursue an enhanced delivery of public services. But
it is also very important that it provides for specialization and division of labour in local public
service functions. Of the various public services that could be provided by an alliance of small
municipalities, a given mayor could spend a more substantial amount of time gaining skills and
information in the provision of a single service that is of interest to his town as well as to the
other towns in the alliance. One practical and fascinating example of this kind of development is
that of the town in southern Bohemia, Hluboká nad Vltavou, which is a part of an alliance of
seven or eight neighbouring villages. The mayor of Hluboká serves in that same capacity for the
other allied villages as well.
It was suggested some time ago (Bryson and Cornia, 2001) that assuring the competent
administration of small units, given their obvious resource and personnel limitations, would
require either the administrative union of small groups of villages, the establishment of an
intermediate level of administration to assist the villages in interacting with the center, or both.
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The recommendation to establish territorial regions to assist the municipalities with their
administrative challenges has already been adopted, as has been explained. The municipalities
were not vertically subordinated to the regions by the reforms that created the latter, and the
municipalities still report directly to the center. Nor have the regions received a mandate to assist
small municipalities lacking the resources to manage their administrative functions
independently.
Perhaps this lack of an assisting link between regions and the many small municipalities
was deliberate in the reform effort, so that the continued paucity of resources in the small towns
will continue to be justification for the traditional centralism favoured in Prague. However, given
the practical and sensible nature of the Czech people, it seems apparent that as the municipalities
develop local capacity the center will support greater local autonomy.
If the municipalities are to achieve a situation permitting greater local autonomy, it
appears they will have to do it on their own. The centre does not wish to force amalgamations,
which would be distasteful to the Czechs in general. But the centre could provide great assistance
for that outcome by providing the appropriate incentives. Through many financial techniques,
transfers, tax sharing and grants could simply be more generous for those municipalities that
demonstrate their willingness to enhance their capacity to provide public services by becoming
part of an alliance of municipalities.
Most of what has been concluded for the Czech Republic applies as well to the Slovak
Republic. Of numerous Slovak references to unions of small municipalities, it is sufficient to cite
Nižňanský (2000, p. 4). This astute observer insists that if it is not efficient for a small
municipality to provide public services on its own, such services can be delivered via diverse
forms of voluntary partnerships, common councils, companies, and agencies operating on the
basis of contractual agreements with municipalities. In some cases, larger municipalities can
provide services through contractual agreements with smaller municipalities in the same
proximity. As in the Czech case, Slovak municipalities will move toward alliances as is helpful.
Appropriate incentive structures for intergovernmental fiscal policies could provide
encouragement to do so.
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Table 1
Number of Czech Municipalities by Size Category*

Size of
Population

Number
of Cities
and
Towns
1,699

Number of
Inhabitants

%

27.2

209,043

2

200-499

2,061

33.1

667,366

6.5

500-999

1,215

19.5

850,216

8.2

1,000-1,999

646

10.4

892,741

8.6

2,000-4,999

345

5.5

1,049,579

10.2

5,000-9,999

135

2.2

934,377

9

10,000-19,999

66

1.1

931,461

9

20,000-49,999

42

0.7

1,216,863

11.8

50,000-99,999

17

0.3

1,168,930

11.3

100,000+

7

0.1

2,413,437

23.4

6,230

100

10,334,013

100

0-199

Total

%

*(1 January 1994). Source: Malý lexikon (Obce České
republiky, 1994).
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Table 2
Municipality Size, Slovak Republic
Municipality Size

Size Categories of Slovak Municipalities in
Percentages
1950

1961

1980

1991

2000

To 499

44.6

35.8

35.3

41.2

41.5

500 – 999

30.6

31.5

29.2

27.6

27.0

1 000 – 1 999

16.7

20.1

20.8

18.5

18.6

2 000 – 4 999

6.2

9.9

10.3

8.4

8.7

5 000 – 9 999

1.2

1.7

2.0

1.8

1.8

10 000 – 49 999

0.7

0.9

2.0

2.2

2.1

Over 50 000

0.06

0.06

0.3

0.4

0.4

Number of

3,344

3,237

2,725

2,825

2,883

1,029

1,302

1,833

1,875

1,874

Municipalities
Comparative Size

Source: Viktor Nižňanský, Slovenská Republika, online at
http://www.vlada.gov.sk/decentralizacia/dokumenty/vniznansky_sk.rtf.
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Table 3
Municipalities with Expanded Activities: Czech Republic, 2003

District

Municipal

2003

In State

Labor

Populace

Populace

workers

Admin

Costs 2003

Kraslice

13,997

7,128

40

18

70

45

179,914

Telč

14,000

6,000

34.5

12

59.5

39.4

240,269

Odry

14,000

8,000

45

23

67

45

427,190

14,300

5,235

36

12

67

36

182,269

Vítkov

14,445

6,411

59

24

78

42

279,333

Holice

15,500

6,220

51.5

16

51.5

37.5

176,369

Aš

16,800

12,480

81

39.3

103

56.3

389,806

Stříbro

17,038

7,605

35

6

71

57.25

196,479

Dobříš

18,715

7,864

45

33

76

57

395,066

Kaplice

18,859

7,042

33

15

66

47

217,076

Česká Třebová

18,877

16,475

48

19.9

87

53.7

226,700

Milevsko

19,146

9,404

46

20

70

45

215,643

Přeštice

19,937

6,507

24

9

76

74

310,487

Holešov

21,632

12,375

60

23

96

55

204,354

Kralovice

22,000

3,500

18

13

51

41.2

262,269

Ivančice

22,980

9,411

76

38

118

48.75

269,475

Přelouč

24,061

8,974

45

5

84

68.1

183,793

24,259

8,993

34

23

62

43

285,029

Mor, Budějovice

24,459

7,938

36

20

74

58

143,980

Kostelec nad Orlicí

25,000

6,200

66

15

107

46

143,214

Nový Bor

26,000

12,000

90

30

147

67

151,544

Bílovec

26,723

7,524

42

18

75

51

204,387

Žamberk

28,742

6,120

31

12

86

62.9

166,395

Tachov

34,618

12,716

47

24

124

95.1

193,266

City, Town

Náměšť nad
Oslavou

Bystřice nad
Perjštejnem

2002

In State

Workers Admin

25

Otrokovice

35,292

19,248

91

48

152

106

202,770

Český Krumlov

40,000

14,365

80

48

159

114

192,094

Kopřivnice

42,034

23,778

95

33

145

72

345,020

Litvínov

43,143

27,143

169

40

216

47

390,685

Beroun

49,091

17,470

139.6

71

230

134.5

170,861

Boskovice

49,900

11,400

68

134

90.1

187,533

Vyškov

50,563

22,433

100

40

199

124

213,889

Písek

51,333

29,791

87

42

178

114,8

221,073

Rakovník

52,482

16,536

86.4

47

186

125.3

177,710

Nový Jičín

52,935

26,641

104

216

159

147,487

Uherský Brod

54,243

17,592

108

52

179

115.37

111,179

Třinec

54,806

38,800

129

69

197

137

215,640

Klatovy

55,000

23,000

64

31

158

120.6

197,690

Kyjov

56,400

12,330

65

29

127

90

220,137

Most

77,836

68,447

231

91

355

231.75

229,732

Sokolov

79,757

25,145

86.4

44

210.2

159.7

204,472

Znojmo

89,964

36,258

126

118

307

213

222,075

Prostějov

98,311

47,535

224

107

329

191.8

352,044

Havířov

99,036

84,879

208

116

292

198

198,640

Pardubice

121,421

89,780

419

235

588

388

356,429

Source: Helena Langšádlová (2003). Online at
http://denik.obce.cz/go/clanek.asp?id=5780899
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Figure 1
Organization of Public Administration:
Republic of Slovakia as of 1.1.2004
Central Government

Ministries, Central Agencies

Regional Offices for Specialized and for General
Municipal State Administration

Regional Self Governments

District Offices for Specialized and for General
Municipal State Administration
Municipalities
Standing and temporary District Working Places
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